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Abstract 
This paper discusses the legal and institutional aspects relating to risk-sharing mechanisms at 
EU level. For this purpose, an attempt will first be made to define a “risk-sharing mechanism” and 
the relevant legal framework, most notably the no bail-out clause included in Article 125 TFEU. 
Following this, the paper will discuss the core legal and institutional considerations relating to the 
European Stability Mechanism, prospects for euro-bonds and some variations of fiscal 
stabilisation mechanisms that have been presented in the discussion. In addition, the brief 
considers the June 2015 Five Presidents’ Report on Completing Europe's Economic and 
Monetary Union and the plans it presents for further risk-sharing among the Member States and 
some of the earlier proposals that have been discussed in this context, even if they have not been 
included in the Five Presidents’ Report. The brief places these proposals in a broader framework 
of legitimacy, accountability and “fairness”, which in the context of the recent EMU Reports have 
usually been approached as separate or additional considerations. The argument made here is, 
however, that a more stable EMU needs to be broadly experienced as legitimate and fair. 
Consequently, these questions should be addressed together, as key considerations relating to 
the broader framework of how decisions are made in the EMU.      
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
† Adjunct Professor of EU Law and Academy of Finland Research Fellow, University of Helsinki; Visiting 
Fellow, Law Department, European University Institute. Email: paivi.leino-sandberg@eui.eu  
 
  
 
 
 
Acknowledgments 
The author would like to acknowledge the support of the ADEMU project, "A Dynamic Economic 
and Monetary Union. This project is related to the research agenda of the ADEMU project, “A 
Dynamic Economic and Monetary Union". ADEMU is funded by the European Union's Horizon 
2020 Program under grant agreement N° 649396 (ADEMU). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_________________________ 
The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union 
funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.  
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International, which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium 
provided that the original work is properly attributed. 
     
2 
 
1. General legal framework 
The original EMU built on two main principles: market discipline and the no bail-out clause included in 
Article 125(1) TFEU: 
The Union shall not be liable for or assume the commitments of central governments, 
regional, local or other public authorities, other bodies governed by public law, or public 
undertakings of any Member State, without prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for 
the joint execution of a specific project. A Member State shall not be liable for or assume 
the commitments of central governments, regional, local or other public authorities, other 
bodies governed by public law, or public undertakings of another Member State, without 
prejudice to mutual financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project. 
The no bail-out clause is linked to the prohibition of monetary financing contained in Article 123(1) 
TFEU. These provisions remain formally unchanged. However, various measures taken during the crisis 
and relating to the future design of the EMU in particular as regards risk-sharing evolve specifically 
around the interpretation of Article 125 TFEU. As the Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group concluded in 
2012, the “’no-bailout’ clause is still alive from a legal perspective but it has clearly lost its original 
power.”1  
There is no single definition for a “risk-sharing mechanism”. It is linked to the question of joint 
responsibility, which is in some Member States regarded as a precondition for a stable EMU, while 
others treat it as a univocally negative element of EMU development. The current and future EMU 
involves several different examples of risk–sharing. During the crisis, various different solutions have 
been used, ranging from bilateral loans, the establishment of the European Financial Stabilisation 
Mechanism and the European Financial Stability Facility to the establishment of the European Stability 
Mechanism and funding from the IMF and ECB.2 Notwithstanding Article 125 TFEU, many of these 
mechanisms have relied on varying degrees of risk-sharing among the Member States. The EFSM was 
adopted as an economic policy measure. Under this mechanism, all Member States formally share the 
risk though the EU budget, which is used as collateral. In the EFSF the risk is shared by the euro states.  
The key measure is however the ESM, which is the permanent stability mechanism, established outside 
the formal Treaty framework with reference to the revised Article 136 TFEU. A further means of risk-
sharing during the crisis has also been through the operations of the ECB: when the ECB balance 
includes bonds of a euro state, the risks related to those bonds are in practice carried jointly by the 
whole euro area, and ultimately divided among them.  While ECB actions do not constitute a 
”mechanism” as such.  Still, they are of a high relevance for any discussion on the legal limits of risk-
sharing, for example as concerns the compatibility of its SMP and OMT programs with the no bail-out 
clause mentioned above. 
                                                          
1 “Completing the Euro. A road map towards fiscal union in Europe. Report of the “Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa Group”, 
point 56 at 37. 
2 There is a great deal of literature on the mechanisms of financial assistance adopted during the crisis. For example the 
following offers a good overview of the measures that have been adopted during the crisis: De Gregorio Merino, ‘Legal 
developments in the Economic and Monetary Union during the debt crisis: The mechanisms of financial assistance’ (2012) 
Common Market Law Review, 1613-1645.  
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The concepts of ‘joint responsibility’ or ‘risk-sharing’ refer to at least two main models. First, the 
broader EMU framework includes examples of insurance-like risk-sharing, where risk is fundamentally 
priced so that each party’s liability corresponds to the coverage it receives.3 In principle, such a 
mechanism does not involve income transfers. An example of this kind of a risk-sharing mechanism is 
the Single Resolution Fund. This kind of mechanisms are usually experienced as legitimate. Another 
kind of a risk-sharing mechanism is a model that builds on systematic income transfers between 
participants.  In this kind of models, wealth is typically transferred from those who have more to those 
who have least. Examples of this kind of a model would include e.g. a country’s internal fiscal 
equalisation mechanism. This kind of models however typically presume a great sense of solidarity 
among participants. Many forms of risk-sharing fall outside clear categories or contain elements of both 
models.  
European risk-sharing can apply at different levels: between citizens, between companies, between 
Member States, and directly at EU level (through the EU budget). So far risk-sharing through EU-budget 
has been rare. The main explanation given to this is the non-existence of a specific euro-zone budget 
that could be used as a collateral in the context of euro area specific operations (see below Section 4). 
In risk-sharing an obvious problem relates to moral hazard and the possibility of free-riders to benefit 
from the arrangements. Insurance-like arrangements nearly always create risks of moral hazard: 
payments intended as insurance-based turn into systematic income transfers. The level at which risk-
sharing takes place affects the way in which moral hazard can be managed or avoided. For example, 
the Single Resolution Fund, which builds on risk-sharing between banks and financial institutions, builds 
on extensive supervision and a regulation framework, which is enforced by independent authorities 
and courts. The arrangements are believed to minimize the risk of free riders. Risk-sharing between 
Member States is more difficult to build, since States are sovereign and the possibilities of the EU 
institutions to ultimately enforce rules on them against their will are limited. This makes these 
mechanisms fragile. 
Future plans involve examples of both models of risk-sharing. A key consideration relating to their 
potential contribution to the EMU relates specifically to two considerations: first, it is realistic to 
presume that it is possible to agree on a set of rules that would be both in theory and practice 
enforceable on sovereign states and effectively prevent free-riding? A sad but necessary conclusion 
from the EMU experiences so far do not support this kind of a conclusion. And second, a relevant 
question relating in particular to mechanisms entailing systematic income transfers involves solidarity. 
The ‘solidarity operations’ conducted so far have effectively divided euro states to creditors and 
debtors. The multiple experiences of unfairness experienced on both sides of the negotiating table have 
rather clearly demonstrated the limits of solidarity currently felt among citizens.  
The key authority in interpreting the no bail-out clause in Article 125 TFEU is the ruling by the European 
Court of Justice (CJEU) in Pringle4. According to the Court,   
                                                          
3 For a discussion around the two models, see e.g. the Report of the expert group appointed by the Finnish Ministry of 
Justice ‘Improving the resilience of Europe´s Economic and Monetary Union’, October 2015, available at 
http://vm.fi/documents/10623/1788346/Improving+the+resilience+of+Europe%C2%B4s+Economic+and+Monetary+Unio
n/96d236f7-2b87-4e1b-a613-d90c1ff15a8c?version=1.0 .  
4 Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of the Court of Justice 
(Full Court) of 27 November 2012, paras 123-147 concerning the interpretation of Article 123 and 135 TFEU. 
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the aim of Article 125 TFEU is to ensure that the Member States follow a sound budgetary 
policy. The prohibition laid down in Article 125 TFEU ensures that the Member States 
remain subject to the logic of the market when they enter into debt, since that ought to 
prompt them to maintain budgetary discipline. Compliance with such discipline 
contributes at Union level to the attainment of a higher objective, namely maintaining the 
financial stability of the monetary union. 
In this ruling, the Court confirmed the legality of the establishment of the ESM and its compatibility 
with Article 125 TFEU. What, however, is of a particular interest for the current study is whether the 
ruling has relevance for a discussion on risk-sharing mechanisms other than the ESM. It is evident that 
the Court only addressed the question brought before it, i.e. the decision to establish the ESM outside 
the formal Union legal framework.  The Court therefore did not take a position relating to any other 
categories of risk-sharing, or mechanisms involving risk-sharing at another level.  
Consequently, since the compatibility of a measure with the EU Treaties can only be settled by the CJEU, 
what kind of other mechanisms could be envisaged under the current Treaties (or outside them) is 
subject to interpretation. However, there seems to be rather general agreement among legal experts 
that many of the mechanisms presented below would require Treaty amendments, either because they 
are incompatible with Article 125 TFEU or because they would require a specific legal basis in the 
Treaties, or both. While formal Treaty amendments are in many ways preferably to simply stretching 
the interpretation of the Treaty, the procedural implication of introducing one is that it needs to be 
approved by all Member States and ratified by their national parliaments. Moreover, some of these 
proposals are likely to provoke constitutional complications at national level.  
The plans for developing the EMU include further mechanisms of risk-sharing, including the creation of 
a fiscal capacity that could be used for the absorption of macroeconomic shocks, and the earlier 
proposals relating to the issuing of common debt in some form. While this discussion is closely linked 
to the question of constitutional limits and budgetary sovereignty, especially in recent debates the 
linkage to the development of the mechanisms of economic governance, and the scope and effects of 
the exercise of EU economic policy competence, is apparent. With more centralised steering of Member 
States’ policies comes further sharing of risks. President Juncker noted this linkage recently in his State 
of the Union speech in September 2015:  
”Some say we need a government of the euro. Others say we need more discipline and 
respect of the rules. I agree with both: we need collective responsibility, a greater sense of 
the common good and respect and implementation of what is collectively agreed.” 
A key question in this respect is whether the EU is capable of controlling Member States’ economic 
policies. If not, are there grounds for greater risk-sharing between the Member States? 
The recent proposals concerning the further development of the EMU also bring to the fore the question 
of greater differentiation between euro area and the general EU institutional framework. Proposals have 
been made for example concerning the creation of a euro area budget, treasury, and a separate of euro 
area composition in the EU Parliament for matters that involve the euro area only (keeping in mind the 
already existing possibility of only euro area states participating in Council decision-making when euro 
area specific issues are concerned). This question also links to the position of the euro group, which is 
currently an informal body with no formal decision-making powers, even if it in practice has settled 
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most key questions relating to the crisis. While all these solutions are fully possible to realize through 
specific Treaty amendments, the most fundamental question would seem to relate to whether these 
plans are politically realistic. In short, it is unlikely that non –euro area Member States would agree to 
Treaty amendments that would develop the differentiation of the euro zone further.  
 
2) European Stability Mechanism   
2.1. Relationship of ESM to the EU legal framework and its possible inclusion 
The most fundamental legal question provoking passions among EU and constitutional lawyers 
concerning the European Stability Mechanism is its compatibility with the EU Treaties. This is the 
question that the CJEU specifically addressed in Pringle.5  The ruling establishes that the decision to 
build the ESM outside the EU Treaties is a legally possible and solid solution. It has so far persisted all 
legal challenges both at European and national levels. Subsequently, the main question provoking legal 
interest has effectively turned into a non-issue. The ESM is currently outside the EU legal framework 
but linked to it through the amendment of Article 136(3) TFEU, which is intended to clarify that the 
Member States do have competence to set it up. Under the new Article 136(3) TFEU, 
The Member States whose currency is the euro may establish a stability mechanism to be 
activated if indispensable to safeguard the stability of the euro area as a whole. The 
granting of any required financial assistance under the mechanism will be made subject 
to strict conditionality.  
The linkages between the ESM and the EU institutional framework are however strong, for example 
because the ESM Treaty confers tasks on the EU institutions, including in particular the Commission, 
the ECB and the EU Court of Justice (see below). 
Even if the ESM Treaty itself does not provide for a formal review clause (unlike the Fiscal Compact and 
the SRF Agreement), the question constantly raised in debates concerning the future design of the EMU 
is the incorporation of the Mechanism into the legal framework of the EU Treaties. The Five Presidents 
report proposes its inclusion into the EU Treaties as a medium-term objective (after 2017). Many 
commentators also suggest that the ESM should be developed towards a true “euro area IMF”, even if 
it is seldom specified what this would entail in practice, and how its tasks would be affected.  The Five 
Presidents’ Report is silent on the need to develop the tasks of the ESM, even if the ESM relevant in the 
context of creating a permanent back-stop for the banking union (both the single resolution mechanism 
and the possible future deposit guarantee scheme), something that would require an amendment of 
the ESM Treaty. 
As far as the inclusion of the ESM into the EU legal framework is considered, a relevant question would 
seem to be what its inclusion would require from a legal point-of-view. Since the ruling of the CJEU in 
Pringle merely addressed the legality of the decision to set up the ESM outside the EU legal framework, 
it did not specifically address other possible solutions for setting it up, and whether its inclusion would 
                                                          
5 Lenaerts, (2014). EMU and the European Union's Constitutional Framework. (2014) European Law Review 753-769; Adam 
& Mena Parras, ‘The European Stability Mechanism through the legal meanderings of the Union's constitutionalism: 
comment on Pringle’ (2013) European Law Review, 848; De Witte & Beukers, ‘Case C-370/12, Thomas Pringle v. Government 
of Ireland, Ireland, The Attorney General, Judgment of the Court of Justice (Full Court) of 27 November 2012’ (2013) 
Common Market Law Review, 805-848. 
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require Treaty amendments. Legal and institutional opinion is divided on this question. However, 
keeping in mind that its inclusion presumes unanimous decision-making among the Member States, 
and that many Member States see that a clear Treaty amendment would be required, this will in 
practice be needed.     
The inclusion of the ESM into the EU legal framework is usually tied to a discussion of the 
“normalization” of the EMU solutions, and making them a part of the mainstream EU institutional 
setting. For many EU lawyers, the main justification for inclusion seems to relate to questions of legal 
style and technique. However, the legal / technical inclusion as such would not have any automatic 
institutional consequences. Even within the EU Treaty framework, the roles of EU institutions, the 
functioning of its governance bodies and ESM funding could be organized in various different ways. 
Even in the ”normal” EU institutional framework decisions can be taken unanimously, with or without 
the European Parliament, and even national parliaments can be linked to decision-making. 6  The 
European Investment Bank serves as a good example of a body created under the Treaties that has a 
separate legal personality, and the Member States are its members. The Statute of the European 
Investment Bank is laid down in a Protocol annexed to the Treaties. At the same time, it has its own 
governance bodies. 
The existence of the ESM outside the formal Treaty framework is not a problem from a legal or technical 
point-of-view. However, the solutions used in the ESM have consequences for accountability, which are 
addressed in the following sub-section.  
 
2.2. Considerations relating to conditionality and “fairness” 
The new Article 136(3) TFEU quoted above creates a clear linkage between financial assistance created 
under the ESM and the implementation of “strict conditionality”.  
This paragraph has been recently discussed for at least two reasons. First, in the context of the Greek 
solution found last summer, the question was raised whether the ESM funding granted actually fulfilled 
the criteria relating to the indispensability of funding in order to “safeguard the stability of the euro 
area as a whole”. Second, questions have been raised concerning the broader role of conditionality in 
the wider crisis management framework, and the related experiences of “unfairness” on all sides. For 
the creditors, conditionality has been deemed a necessary safeguard in order to avoid moral hazard, 
especially since the EU rules relating to economic governance have not operated in a credible manner. 
If the granting of financial assistance presumes strict conditionality, thus effectively reducing the 
recipient state’s room of maneuver, these are likely to do their utmost to avoid being subject to it. This 
setting has been experienced as unfair in many of the debtor states. At the same time, also the creditors 
have experienced the solutions made during the crisis as unfair, since they have in practice needed to 
                                                          
6 See e.g. Article 218(8) of the TFEU, under which the European Council is to act unanimously for the agreement on accession 
of the Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Council's 
decision concluding this agreement is to enter into force after it has been approved by the Member States in accordance 
with their respective constitutional requirements. A decision, as referred to in Article 311 of the TFEU and adopted 
unanimously by the Council, laying down the provisions relating to the system of own resources of the Union cannot enter 
into force until it is approved by the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. 
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bear financial responsibility for decisions that they have not been able to influence. The point to 
consider in the context of considering the future design of the EMU is that a(n economic) policy that is 
not experienced as legitimate is seldom effective.7 
The formal answer usually offered to the unfairness of the EMU places the blame firmly on the ESM. 
According to Article 3 of the ESM Treaty,  
The purpose of the ESM hall be to mobilise and provide stability support under strict 
conditionality, appropriate to the financial assistance instrument chosen, to the benefit of 
ESM Members which are experiencing, or are threatened by severe financing problems, if 
indispensable to safeguard the financial stability of the euro area as a whole or its Member 
States. 
This presumes assessment by the Commission, in liaison with the ECB, of the existence of a risk; whether 
public debt is sustainable; and the actual and potential financing needs of the ESM Member. The 
process results in a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), negotiated by the Commission together 
with the ECB and, whenever possible, the IMF. The conditionality setting, however, reaches into the EU 
legal framework as well, since also the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism,8 and the two-pack 
mechanism of enhanced surveillance, applied to euro states that experience or are threatened with 
serious difficulties with respect to their financial stability or to the sustainability of their public finances 
or request or receive financial assistance,9 include elements of conditionality. This conditionality sits ill 
with the EU’s economic policy competence (Session 2 relating to economic governance).  
When assessing the legitimacy and “fairness” of an arrangement, a key element relates not only to how 
decisions have been prepared and adopted, but also to whether they can be ex post scrutinized by a 
court of justice. The mechanisms of judicial review have not developed at same pace with the European 
level development of decision-making. In practice, appeals concerning MOU-related measures required 
from program countries with reference to conditionality have repeatedly been declared inadmissible 
by the EU Courts. This has been justified with reference to the decision-making structures used to adopt 
the MOUs. For example, as regards the Cypriot stability program, the Court as argued that the 
Commission or the European Central Bank cannot be considered responsible for the MOU, and the 
measures adopted by them only bind the ESM. And since the latter is not a Union body, the Court 
cannot assess the legality of its measures.10 The Court has also assessed the meaning of euro group 
statements in the restructuring of the Cypriot banking sector and established that these cannot be 
treated as measures that are intended to create binding effects in relation to third parties, since the 
                                                          
7 I have discussed this point further in “Further development of the EMU – should legitimacy come first or last?” at 
http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.be/2015/11/further-development-of-emu-should.html, subsequently published at 
Constitutional Change through Euro Crisis Law. A Multi-level Legal Analysis at page 
http://eurocrisislaw.eui.eu/news/comment-further-development-of-the-emu-should-legitimacy-come-first-or-last-by-
paivi-leino-sandberg/ and on page Open Government in the EU. News, research and debates on transparency & 
participation at http://www.eu-opengovernment.eu/ . 
8 See e.g. considering Ireland, Council implementing decision 2011/827/EU; considering Portugal, Council implementing 
decision 2011/344/EU. 
9 Regulation (EU) No 472/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 May 2013 on the strengthening of 
economic and budgetary surveillance of Member States in the euro area experiencing or threatened with serious difficulties 
with respect to their financial stability 
10 See e.g. Case T-289/13 Ledra Advertising Ltd v Commission and the ECB; Case T-289/13 Ledra Advertising Ltd v the 
Commission and ECB. 
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formal measure was taken in the ESM governing bodies.11 From a legitimacy and accountability point 
of view it is a problem if decisions that touch upon matters of great importance that also affect private 
parties directly prove to be non-challangeable at the level where they are taken, because they are 
decisions that “nobody is responsible for”. This is especially so keeping in mind that the practical 
difference between the euro group and the meeting of the ESM governing bodies is minimal: decisions 
are effectively taken by exactly the same group of people, even if in a different role and meeting 
composition. While some of these decisions have been successfully challenged at national level, these 
challenges have their main focus on the national implementation measures, not on the actual MOU 
instrument (Cf session 1 on the constitutional constraints of decision-making).  
Therefore, when considering the possible inclusion of the ESM, the main reason for the project does 
not relate to the technical-institutional aspects of inclusion but the overall legitimacy of the 
construction, in particular the need to ensure that decisions of a great importance are effectively 
challengeable before a court. A reconsideration of the decision-making structures and court jurisdiction 
is a question that links to the broader question of the status of the euro area in the EU constitutional 
structure and its institutional solutions. This is a question that has not been addressed by the recent 
Reports.  
 
2.3. ESM and Collective Action Clauses 
The experiences from the crisis have stressed the need to separate liquidity problems from solvency 
problems. One of the elements that the Commission and the ECB need to assess before a decision 
granting financial assistance from the ESM is taken relates to whether public debt of the state 
requesting assistance is sustainable. The crisis witnessed five euro area countries, in relation to which 
a decision needed to be made between creating a financial assistance scheme (which was problematic 
from many political and legal reasons) or insolvency, the management of which was seen to create even 
greater risks for the euro area as a whole, since there was no established procedure for managing 
insolvency, and the close linkages between the banks and sovereigns.  
One step towards demolishing this linkage is the banking union (session 4). A second crucial element 
relates to the introduction and use of Collective Action Clauses. Various proposals aimed at 
operationalizing sovereign debt restructuring have been made both at the euro area level and based 
on international law.12 The ESM Treaty establishes that from the beginning of 2013, new sovereign 
bonds in the euro area must include standard collective clauses (CACs) to simplify sovereign debt 
restructuring. Under ESM Treaty Article 12(3),  
Collective action clauses shall be included, as of January 2013, in all new euro area 
government securities, with maturity above one year, in a way which ensures that their 
legal impact is identical.  
The aim of these clauses is to include terms and conditions for negating a controlled debt restructuring.  
                                                          
11 Se e.g. Case T-327/13 Konstantinos Mallis and Elli Konstantinou Malli v Commission and the ECB. 
12 Bianco, ‘The Bitter End of Sovereign Debt Restructurings: The Abaclat v. Argentina Arbitration ad the Eurozone Crisis’ 
(2013) Legal Issues of Economic Integration, 315¸ Pottakis, ‘In Search of a Modern Deus ex Machina: Towards an Orderly 
Bankruptcy of European Legal Orders’, (2011) European Public Law, 181. 
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It is important to note that neither the Five Presidents’ report nor the recent Commission 
Communication address the question of orderly debt restructuring in general, or the CACs in particular. 
However, the question of whether a euro state can become insolvent without serious consequences 
for the euro area as a whole is one of the core considerations in guaranteeing a stable EMU, and 
should therefore be added to the agenda for discussion.  
 
 
3. Prospects for Euro-bonds 
In recent years a number of proposals relating to greater risk-sharing among Member States have been 
made, building on joint and several debt, a debt redemption fund, and Eurobonds.13 Apart from their 
economic function, the discussion has also related to their compatibility with the current Treaties, since 
the linkage of these scenarios to Article 125 TFEU is obvious. The discussion led to the appointment of 
an Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills.14  
The idea of a debt redemption fund was originally created by the German Council of Economic Experts, 
and was linked to the wish to reduce public debt reaching over 60% GDP. The plan was based on a ’fund’ 
and a ’pact’, creating a scheme that is used to reduce debt through temporary mutualisation (25 years) 
of debt exceeding 60 %. After that risk-sharing would be limited to financial stability mechanisms, be 
subject to strict conditionality, and only be used as a last-resort mechanism. The Fund would be used 
to mutualise debt exceeding 60 % through issuing joint debt backed up by a joint and several guarantee. 
The Pact would include rules intended to prevent moral hazard including debt brakes, binding 
consolidation agreements, and earmarking tax revenues and Member State deposits. Breaking of rules 
would be sanctioned. It is, however, generally understood that the creation of a debt redemption fund 
presumes Treaty amendments, and would also provoke constitutional debates at national level. 
Eurobills refer to ”government fixed-income securities up to a predefined, short-term maturity, jointly 
issued by the Member States”. They would be divided to blue bonds used up to 60% GDP, which would 
constitute super safe senior bonds, covered by joint and several guarantee. Red bonds exceeding 60% 
GDP would always be subject to national responsibility and could not be not bailed out by EU 
mechanisms. The idea behind eurobills was to stabilise markets and create a safe and liquid asset by 
establishing ceilings for financing set for each participating Member State and rules and mechanisms 
for preventing moral hazard through a specified institutional framework.  
Both the DRF and eurobills are widely considered incompatible with Article 125 TFEU.15 For legal and 
political reasons, these proposals have not been included in the Five Presidents’ Report. Despite the 
                                                          
13  See e.g. the Commission Green Paper on introducing Stability Bonds COM(2011) 818 final; the 2012 Commission Blueprint 
and  a number of contributions by think-tanks on the Joint issuance of government debt. 
14 Final Report of the Expert Group on Debt Redemption Fund and Eurobills Chaired by Gertrude Tumpel-Gugerell, 31 March 
2014. See also  Allemand, ‘La faisibilité juridique des projets d’euro-obligations’ (2012) Revue trimestrielle de droit 
européen, 553-594. 
15 See the e.g. the Expert Report quoted above, Ibid.  
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proposals to create a solid institutional framework with strong and enforceable rules, a question 
remains as to whether it is realistic to expect that rules would operate better in this context, when they 
have so spectacularly failed to do so in the current economic governance framework. Serious concerns 
have been raised i since the EU governance mechanisms have not necessarily been seen as sufficiently 
effective and strong to contain the additional potential for moral hazard. The proposals relating to joint 
debt also have a clear linkage to the division of competence relating to economic and financial 
competence between the Member States and the EU.  
Can you assume joint responsibility for debt without joint responsibility for the adoption of 
budgetary policies? Furthermore, could a system building on joint debt be “fair” as long as 
Member States’ debt levels diverge as greatly as they do no? 
 
4. Fiscal stabilisation mechanisms 
The plans towards the development of a fiscal union include proposals relating to the establishment of 
fiscal stabilisation mechanisms.16 With monetary policy in EU exclusive domain, the instruments that 
are generally used to limit impacts of cyclical downturn at national level (specific monetary policies and 
devaluation of national currency) are not available. In the absence of monetary policy tools, Member 
States make recourse to internal devaluation, i.e. lowering the costs of labour. The relevant question 
is, whether there should be an EU level mechanism for cross-country fiscal transfers in the event of 
cyclical downturn. The 2012 Blueprint proposed fiscal capacity to adjust asymmetric shocks, which were 
linked to the idea of contractual arrangements on reforms promoting growth and jobs. The discussion 
concerning this has however not advanced.  
These questions are linked to the possible creation of a euro area treasury and budget, which are 
included in the Five Presidents’ Report through the ambiguous phrase ”some decisions would 
increasingly need to be made collectively” but with no specification on what decisions, how large the 
budget would be, or how taxes would be collected or used. These are questions that should definitely 
be discussed first. However, in this context it is useful to keep in mind that the current ’own resources’ 
system (Article 311 TFEU) already operates a slightly similar federal feature, consisting of the EU’s 
revenues building on customs duties and sugar levies. In several federal states, the central government 
has a taxation right. It is possible that the use of a separate euro-area budget might be a more 
acceptable way to joint responsibility, if it was used to collect resources for insurance-like income 
transfers or other fiscal equalisation mechanisms. In general, few proposals have been made 
concerning how the resources would be collected, and what they would be used for. The creation of a 
fiscal stabilization function is not an end in itself, but should serve some legitimate purpose.  
The difficulty in analyzing the legal aspects of these schemes is that the discussion has remained on a 
very general and abstract level. According to settled case-law by the EU Courts, the choice of the legal 
basis for a Union measure must rest on objective factors amenable to judicial review, including in 
particular the aim and the content of the measure.17 Therefore, legal basis analysis is usually 
                                                          
16 Hinarejos, ‘Fiscal Federalism in the European Union: Evolution and future choices for EMU’ (2014) Common Market Law 
Review, 1621-1642; Pisani-Ferry, Vihriälä, and Wolff, “Options for a Euro-area fiscal capacity”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, 
No 2013/01 (2013); European Parliament, Legal options for an additional EMU fiscal capacity (2013). 
17 See C-411/06 Commission v. Parliament and Council para 45, C‑178/03 Commission v. Parliament and Council, paragraph 
41, and C‑155/07 Parliament v. Council, para 34. 
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undertaken based on a concrete proposal, its aims and substance. In the case of fiscal stablisation 
mechanisms, no such proposal exists.   
In 2014 Commissioner Andor voiced proposals concerning a short-term unemployment benefit 
scheme.18 This consisted of a basic European unemployment insurance, which would replace the 
corresponding part of national schemes. National authorities would collect unemployment fees and 
send them to the European fund; the European fund would pay to the national authorities an amount 
that corresponds to the sum of all the basic European unemployment benefits payments to be made 
that month in that country. The system would operate outside EU budget and be ”entirely predictable 
and calculable on the basis of these clear rules”. The details and compatibility of the scheme with the 
EU treaties and its possible legal basis has not been subject to comprehensive discussion.  
The Five Presidents' Report proposes the introduction of a stability scheme for the euro area's public 
economy. In the short run (Stage 1), the five Presidents propose the creation of an advisory European 
Fiscal Board which would coordinate and complement already existing national fiscal councils. It would 
provide an independent analysis, at European level, of how budgets perform against the economic 
objectives set out in the EU fiscal governance framework. In the longer term (Stage 2), a common 
macroeconomic stabilisation function should be set up to better deal with shocks that cannot be 
managed at the national level alone. It would improve the cushioning of large macroeconomic shocks 
and make EMU more resilient. Such a stabilisation function could build on the European Fund for 
Strategic Investments as a first step, by identifying a pool of financing sources and investment projects 
specific to the euro area, to be tapped into. 
According to the Report, the scheme must not lead to the permanent redistribution of income between 
euro area countries, nor should it be a method to balance income between countries. The stability 
scheme must not impair incentives to practice policies that aim at a healthy public economy or inhibit 
intervention in structural deficiencies. The scheme should not become a crisis management tool, i.e. its 
purpose is not to replace the ESM. It should be open and transparent with regard to all EU Member 
States. Compliance with the euro convergence criteria would be the prerequisite for participation in 
the stability scheme. The report emphasises that the stability scheme must be implemented within the 
framework of the EU, so that it is compatible with the EU's public economy framework and coordination 
procedures. According to the Five Presidents’ Report, the details of the mechanism are to be worked 
out by an Expert group at a later stage, which makes it difficult to address its legal and institutional 
implications at this stage.  
Many economic arguments can probably be found in favour of a rule-based equalising 
mechanism. However, its creation raises similar considerations relating to compliance with 
the new binding convergence criteria a precondition for participation as have been raised 
in relation to the enforcement of other EU rules in the area – would these work better than 
the current criteria and procedures? How does one differentiate between economic 
                                                          
18 Andor, “Social dimension of the Economic and Monetary Union: what lessons to draw from the European elections?”, 
Lecture at Hertie School of Governance, Berlin, 13 June 2014; Andor, “Basic European unemployment insurance: Countering 
divergences within the Economic and Monetary Union”, Speech at Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, 29 
September 2014; Beblavý, Gros and Maselli, “Reinsurance of National Unemployment Benefit Schemes” (2015) available at 
<http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/wd401.pdf> (last visited 27 June 2015); Dolls, Fuest, Neumann and Peichl, “An 
Unemployment Insurance Scheme for the Euro Area”, ZEW Discussion Paper No 14-095 (2014). 
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downturn and structural problems? Is it possible to prevent one-way income transfers by 
rules and institutions, when they should be enforced on sovereign States? 
 
 
 
